Introduction
The British banking system emerged from World War I with a degree of centralization unprecedented among major industrial nations. Five major clearing banks formed a collusive oligopoly that constituted one of the most powerful and enduring monopoly positions in any major British industry. Such concentration had potentially far-reaching consequences for British economic development, as banks constitute the main intermediaries between domestic savers and non-mortgage borrowers.
Neoclassical economic theory indicates that monopolists will impose welfare losses on society, as profit-maximization produces a lower output and higher profits compared with perfect competition. Excluded customers may be substantial in volume and would be worthy of finance in a competitive market, but will be those who represent, or (given imperfect information) are considered to be, the least profitable business. This, in turn, will discourage new competitors in situations where first mover advantages would make it difficult for entrants to compete for the monopolist's existing customers.
The welfare losses from monopoly might be offset by increases in technical efficiency due to increased scale. However, empirical research for post-1945 Britain has generally corroborated the existence of substantial welfare losses, while finding little evidence that these were offset by technical gains. While some studies found that monopoly positions were gradually eroded, this was shown to typically be a very long and slow process. 1 Recent analysis of banking profitability lends support to the hypothesis that the banks reaped monopoly profits. True interwar banking profits were found to be both substantially greater than published figures and-particularly during the 1920s-to have compared well even with British manufacturing (which was regarded as being of substantially higher risk-as evidenced by the lower risk premium attached to banking shares and their purchase by institutions that would not consider even large manufacturers' stock). 2 The clearing banks have also come in for unfavorable comparison to their continental rivals-with regard to their domestic developmental role-one strand of a broader 'city/industry' critique of the internal economic consequences of Britain's metropolitan and externally orientated financial system. 3 Conversely, banking historians have often been skeptical regarding whether Britain's concentrated interwar banking structure significantly reduced the volume of industrial lending, even with respect to small firms. 4 Indeed Duncan M. Ross even goes so far as to argue that the banking market was efficient, and that excluded borrowers were limited to those not worthy of finance at the competitive market equilibrium. 5 Elsewhere, he notes that banks may have acted as discriminating monopolists, but argues that this would again have left only charlatans and very marginal cases for new entrants. 6 This article re-examines the attitudes of the interwar clearing banks regarding lending to firms of insufficient size to raise funds via a public share issue (for larger firms the stock market provided an important counter to the banks' monopoly power), particularly for longer term requirements. Banks limited their lending to short-term working capital to a much greater extent than their more localized predecessors (despite firms' growing requirements for long-term capital). They aimed to maximize liquidity so as to minimize risk, and felt secure in dictating their own terms to industry as, given their tight cartel, they 6. Duncan M. Ross, ''Commercial Banking in a Market-Orientated Financial System: Britain Between the Wars, '' Economic History Review 49, no. 2 (1996): 314-35. faced a largely captive market-at least for companies of insufficient size for a public share issue.
The banks' restrictive lending criteria became politically controversial from the time of the emergence of the 'Big Five', as evidenced by the debate over the alleged 'Macmillan Gap' in finance to smaller enterprises. 7 Rejecting the existence of any significant Macmillan Gap would imply one of three hypotheses: that smaller firms had no need for long-term external capital; that such capital was already adequately provided by other sources; or that the banks were already acting as long-term financiers, despite their public and private protestations to the contrary. This last hypothesis has generally been rejected by recent research on bank lending, which has found that banks followed their own theoretical precepts in confining their activities to the formal provision of short-term loans, for working capital.
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Existing research on the Macmillan Gap has focused upon negative rather than positive findings. Banking historians have taken the absence of concrete evidence for a substantial group of viable and profitable lending propositions that were not adequately served by existing capital market facilities as proof that that no significant gap existed. They have not positively demonstrated that there were either sufficient alternative sources of long-term funding, or a lack of industrial demand for such finance. Yet, as Dieter Ziegler has noted, quantitative archival analysis of the Macmillan Gap is fraught with difficulty. Bank archives are unlikely to provide any real reflection of rejected business, as applications of the type deemed unsuitable would be discouraged verbally by local managers (an informal 7. Harold MacMillan, Report of the Committee on Finance and Industry, Cmnd. 3897 (London, 1931 Capie and Michael Collins, ''Banks, Industry and Finance, 1880 -1914 ,'' Business History 41, no. 1 (1999 Forrest Capie and Michael Collins, ''Industrial Lending by English Commercial Banks, 1860 -1914 : Why Did Banks Refuse Loans,'' Business History 38, no. 1 (1996 Mae Baker and Michael Collins, ''English Commercial Bank Stability, 1860 -1914 ,'' Journal of European Economic History 31, no. 3 (2002 : 508-09; Mae Baker and Michael Collins, ''English Industrial Distress Before 1914 and the Response of the Banks,'' European Review of Economic History 3, no. 1 (1999): 1-24; Lucy Newton, The Victorian Economy in Transition: A Regional Perspective (Aldershot, U.K., forthcoming), Chapters 3 and 4. There is some evidence of medium-term lending and a difference between stated and actual duration of loans, but for an earlier period. See Michael Collins and Mae Baker, Commercial Bank and Industrial Finance in England and Wales, 1860 -1913 (Oxford, U.K., 2005 screening process); meanwhile, industrial archives are heavily biased toward survival and success. 9 Contemporaries also observed that propositions falling outside the banks' criteria for legitimacy were 'invisible' to the system; for example O. T. Falk of stockbrokers, Buckmaster and Moore, stated that, ''the banks as a whole deny the existence of the problem because it is so well known that they will not lock up capital that they are not approached by small people wanting to start a new business. Hence they do not come in contact with the gap. '' 10 Critics of the Macmillan Gap have pointed to the limited success of the new lending institutions established during the 1930s, ostensibly to breach this gap, as proof that there was no unmet demand for finance which could be catered for without incurring risks that would ''endanger the stability of the financial system as a whole. '' 11 This paper provides the first detailed examination of these new institutions using archival evidence (including internal business records, and reports and memoranda to the Bank of England and the clearing banks). This shows that, with the exception of Credit for Industry Ltd (CFI) and those organizations limited to severely depressed areas, the 'Macmillan Gap' institutions essentially catered for companies that might be suitable for a public share issue within a few years, rather than typical small-medium firms. Meanwhile CFI's operations were severely constrained by the clearing banks, which undermined its viability by 'poaching' clients it had vetted and approved. It thus makes an important contribution both to the debate regarding the banks' exercise of monopoly power and their responses to market entry-showing that they acted as 'jealous monopolists'-frustrating officially sponsored attempts to foster the development of specialist medium-long-term industrial lending institutions. The next section examines the impact of the concentration of English and Welsh clearing banks into the London-based Big Five on bank-industry relations. In addition to reviewing evidence from other studies, regarding the trend toward short-term lending covered by collateral security as concentration grew, this section provides new evidence regarding moves toward quantitative credit rationing by 
Bank Mergers and the Restriction of Industrial Lending
The 1860s witnessed the onset of a merger movement among clearing banks in England and Wales, which intensified from the 1880s. This centralized much of the banking business into large firms, headquartered in London, which serviced the provinces only through their branch networks. By 1911, London-based banking groups controlled 56 percent of UK branches and 65 percent of deposits. 12 World War I witnessed a renewed burst of merger activity, buoyed up by particularly high banking profits. Banks were acquired at very high prices, threatening to seriously dilute the future profitability of the sector. Yet barriers to entry protected the banks from the fate that befell many industrial firms who had participated in the war/postwar merger mania. The main barrier was access to the London Clearing House, which was tightly restricted and had become essential for large-scale branch banking. 13 As Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah noted, ''If a tighter banking oligopoly could reduce competition and raise sustainable long-run profits, the acquiring banks' shareholders might yet benefit. Fortunately for them (though arguably less happily for the banks' customers Capie and G. Rodrik-Bali, ''Banking Concentration in British Banking, 1870 -1920 ,'' Business History 24, no. 3 (1982 'Sectoral Differences in English Bank Asset Structures and the Impact of Mergers, 1860 -1913 ,'' Business History 43, no. 4 (2001 13. Forrest Capie and Mark Billings, ''Evidence on Competition in English Commercial Banking, 1920 -1970 ,'' Financial History Review 11, no. 1 (2004 14. Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah, Barclays: The Business of Banking 1690 (Cambridge, U.K., 2001 Bank lending had traditionally been short-term, having developed in an era when the long-term capital needs of industry were generally modest and most businessmen required loans primarily for working capital and cash flow. 15 The merger movement and the 1878 City of Glasgow Bank crisis accentuated this emphasis on liquidity, London-based head offices issuing directives for more restrictive lending criteria than their provincial antecedents had imposed.
16
Recent examination of bank lending during 1880-1914 has shown that most commercial bank support for industry constituted shortterm credits for cash flow and working capital; the mean duration of loans (allowing for renewals of overdrafts) varying from 13 to 19 months at different subperiods, while the median duration was only 8-12 months. Some loans were rolled-over for long periods, but the fact that they could be recalled at short notice precluded borrowers from using funds for illiquid purposes such as capital expenditure. 17 Meanwhile unsecured loans, which accounted for 64.6 percent of all industrial loans during the whole 1880-1914 period, had declined to only 27.3 percent by 1910-1914 (the remainder requiring collateral that almost always covered the full value of the outstanding loan). 18 Michael Collins and Mae Baker explain this in terms of the growth of incorporation, which removed the unlimited liability of many 15. Collins, ''Banks, Industry and Finance, 1880-1914 Collins and Baker, Commercial Banks, 196, 198; Collins and Baker, ''British Commercial Bank Support, '' 48. 18. Capie and Collins, ''Banks, Industry, and Finance, '' 43 and Collins and Baker, ''British Commercial Bank Support, '' 48. businesses. 19 However, this trend also coincided with the move from local to national banks. Baker and Collins argue that, even by 1914, the absorption of regional, by national, banks had led to the nurturing of a highly liquid industrial loans portfolio, a decline in credit provision to the private sector, and an overall rise in bank liquidity. 20 They also found that while banks were often prepared to continue support for distressed borrowers, they maintained an arms-length approach even during such crises. Rather than intervention, their key strategy for minimizing bad debts was avoiding entering into relationships with potentially problematic clients. 21 By the end of the final major banking merger wave, in 1918, London-based head offices had assumed unprecedented importance in vetting loans. Practice varied between banks; the Midland, National Provincial, and Westminster adopted a centralized policy, while Lloyds was somewhat less centralized, local committees giving opinions on loan applications. 22 Barclays adopted the most decentralized vetting system among the major banks, its system of 'local boards,' with discretion regarding advances below £20,000, having been cited as a reason for its success in expanding its proportion of the Big Five's interwar advances. 23 Evidence also suggests that following the merger wave there was a move towards quantitative credit rationing. In August 1922 the business magazine System published an interview with an unnamed bank manager who explained that headquarters' vetting took account not only of the merits of the proposal, but of the ''bulk total of requests made by the branches all over the country . . . If the bulk of the loans asked for at any given moment is too heavy, then it means that some of the loans must be refused-not because they are bad security, but because of the general condition of the loanable funds of the bank at that moment.'' 28 Such quantitative rationing, at times when the overall ratio of advances to deposits significantly exceeded the banks' 50 percent upper benchmark, was also mentioned by John Rae, Chief General Manager of the Westminster (in evidence to the Macmillan Committee), who noted that his bank, had on occasion to call in advances due to their high aggregate advances ratio.
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Crick provided further corroboration, explaining to the OERG that banks engaged in quantitative rationing during periods of financial stringency, such as 1928 to the beginning of 1930 (when a reduction in deposits raised the advances ratio from 55 to 58 percent; the banks' preferred maximum being given as 50 percent). Refusals were concentrated among new customers, in order that long-established clients would be properly financed-paralleling the 26. Great Britain, Committee on Finance and Industry, Minutes of evidence (London, 1931) clearing banks' post-1945 rationing criteria. 30 Similarly, the bank manager interviewed in System noted that when loans had to be rationed: ''. . . obviously they will be allotted to customers of old standing, for their normal trading requirements, rather than to the expansion of young enterprises. '' 31 The potential monopoly power of the Big Five gave rise to considerable political controversy. Government responded by appointing the Colwyn Committee in 1918. The Committee's report ended the merger boom and, while further amalgamations occurred, mergers between the Big Five were effectively prohibited. It noted the danger of reduced competition in the banking sector and the possibility of the emergence of a single 'Money Trust' with control over British clearing banking. The banks countered such criticism by arguing that amalgamation would lead to increased competition among the remaining banks. They also defended their actions on industrial finance grounds, arguing that larger banks would be better placed to meet the needs of the postwar industrial recovery and the demands of the larger enterprises that were emerging from the industrial merger wave. In addition to efficiency gains from increased scale, they would be able to loan funds based on national, rather than local, pools of deposits.
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Francesca Carnevali has highlighted the heavy bias toward national banking interests among the Colwyn Committee's expert witnesses and the strong representation of bankers in its membership. Only one manufacturer, Thomas Bertram Johnston, was called to give evidence, and argued strongly-citing examples from the Bristol area-that support for local manufacturing ceased once local banks were taken over by national groups. Carnevali also argues that the evidence presented by banking interests in favor of large-scale banking presented an exaggerated picture of the degree to which British industry had become concentrated, and the extent to which Germany and Britain's other principal competitors had banking systems dominated by large combines. 33 Similar points were made in Lavington's 1921 study of the English capital market, which noted that amalgamation had been accompanied by a centralization of decision making, a more 'mechanical' approach to vetting loan applications, and a switch in emphasis from assessment of the borrower to the security offered, thus excluding, ''. . . business men who may be unable to offer security for a supply of capital but whose character and abilities give them a good social title to its use.'' 35 Such a mechanical approach was, in part, necessitated by centralized decision making. 'Local knowledge' is highly 'tacit' (not amenable to formal codification), and thus, not easily transmissible upward through a hierarchical decisionmaking process, especially where this is separated by distance. Basing lending on criteria such as appropriate collateral facilitated the development of clear rules that could be easily communicated from head office to branch managers, thus avoiding misunderstandings or ambiguities within the decision-making system regarding what constituted appropriate business. 36 Moreover, collateral requirements constituted a low-cost screening process. Banking theory suggests that banks maximize profits by engaging in transactions which incur the lowest marginal costs relative to the price charged. These include ex-ante assessment of loan propositions and ex-post-monitoring of clients. Knowledge regarding the inherent risk of the loan is highly biased toward the borrower, while tacit information is concentrated among local business networks. Lenders without access to such networks are likely to find gathering information a costly and time-consuming process, which imposes high transactions costs. 37 They are therefore unlikely to engage in such gathering-unless competitive pressures by rival banks force them to do so.
The emergence of nationally based banks thus resulted in a transformation of the banking system from 'relationship banking'-underpinned by close personal monitoring of clients by bank directors embedded in their local business milieu-towards 'transaction banking,' characterized by bureaucratic and centralized decision making; short-term loans; formal screening and monitoring processes; and an emphasis on collateral security. 38 Analysis of 586 English commercial bank loans to industry over the period 1920-39 by Collins and Baker revealed that the mean length had fallen to 6.5 months, and the median 6 months, with 99 percent being granted in the first instance for a year or less. Meanwhile, some 86 percent of loans were ostensibly for working capital (with only 6 percent for fixed capital expenditure) and 84 percent were covered by collateral security. They 37. Carnevali, Europe's Advantage, 9. 38. In its most extreme form, transaction banking involves the bank treating each loan as a separate transaction, and not drawing upon any long-term bank/client relationship that may exist. In turn, customers are free to operate in the lending market to seek the most preferential borrowing terms. In this system, banks lend for short periods, have a highly liquid portfolio, engage in rigorous screening and monitoring of borrowers, and require collateral in order to ease the recovery of debt in cases of default. A less extreme form of this type of banking was practiced by the main British clearing banks. See Baker and Collins, ''English Commercial Bank Stability,'' 504-05 and 510; Collins and Baker, ''Commercial Banks and Industrial Finance,'' 53-55; Mae Baker, ''English Bank Business Loans, 1920-1968 also found that the application of standardized screening procedures to restrict business to low-risk borrowers appears to have mitigated against SMEs. 39 Banks justified their policies on grounds of liquidity and safety, stressing their essential obligation to depositors. As A. G. Sugg of the Westminster explained in 1927, the banker, ''. . . has to bear in mind that the money he would like to loan . . . is derived from other customers' deposits, largely repayable on demand, and he must always aim, therefore, at keeping his position liquid, his assets easily realisable, his loans of short duration, and, of course, well secured. '' 40 Loans were often 'rolled-over' for longer periods than originally granted, but banks tried to safeguard themselves against a gradual transformation of short into long-term advances by reconsidering every advance at least annually, and customers were deterred from using ostensibly short-term loans for long-term purposes by the knowledge that renewal was by no means automatic. 41 
The Macmillan Gap Identified
To what extent did these changes impact disproportionately on smaller firms? Provincial industrialists and their organizations made frequent complaints that centralization, together with the banks' more mechanical approach to loan applications, was disadvantaging them. . . . a general feeling of dissatisfaction with the Banks . . . Many people stated that Foreign Banks in London were far more enterprising than English Banks and were anxious to help even the small businessman. There were also many complaints against the policy of centralisation. It was said that not only was the banking system being mechanised, but that local managers were being turned into machines for the transmission of requests to Head Office. 42 When questioned regarding the impact of bank amalgamations on loans to new and small businesses, Crick stated that he thought amalgamation had reduced the volume of such advances, which he viewed as, ''. . . all to the good, as it was precisely this type of advance which had been responsible for so many bank failures in the past. '' 43 Yet he denied that ''legitimate borrowing by small businesses'' was being turned down. 44 The question of what constituted ''legitimate borrowing'' was to underpin much of the interwar debate on the Macmillan Gap.
The official histories of the Midland and Barclays Banks noted that they conducted a large volume of industrial lending, regarded this as an important area of business, and often, repeatedly renewed overdrafts. 45 Yet, a substantial proportion of this renewed lending concerned long-term indebtedness by firms in the staple industries, which had embarked on a spree of speculative investment in the immediate aftermath of World War I, much of which served only to bid up the value of the existing plant. Following the collapse of the short postwar boom, banks found themselves saddled with heavy loans to companies that often had no immediate prospect of repaying them. In these circumstances, they felt obliged to continue assistance, in order to prevent a sudden collapse of these sectors, and the transformation of problematic debts into bad ones. For example, in the cotton industry, both national and Lancashire banks continued to support struggling firms, an increasing proportion of bank assets thus becoming frozen in this sector. 46 Similarly, the ailing steel industry accounted for 7 3/4 percent of Midland's overdrafts; 10 percent of National Provincial's, and 3. Such debts were eventually alleviated, either due to a return to more prosperous conditions (as in steel), or, as in cotton, on account of Bank of England sponsored industrial rationalization programs. Yet, banks were reluctant to become involved in industrial restructuring and, J. H. Bamberg argues, the motivation of the Bank of England in sponsoring rationalization was to protect the banks as opposed to offering serious solutions for industry. 48 Many effected companies also proved hostile to rationalization schemes, their opposition contributing to the banks' reluctance to support such interventions. 49 Despite a few case-studies, there is very little systematic demandside evidence regarding the extent to which demands for credit from smaller firms (or those in sectors where the banks were less committed by indebtedness) went unmet-one major problem being the survival of documents. 1919 -1936 (London, 1967 to us that great difficulty is experienced by the smaller and mediumsized businesses in raising . . . capital . . . even when the security offered is perfectly sound . . . ''-which soon became known as the Macmillan Gap. 54 While 'capital' could be interpreted as not strictly encompassing loan finance, the reference to 'security' indicates that the Macmillan Committee were using the word in a broad context; as a Bank of England memorandum noted, 'resources,' rather than capital, might have more adequately reflected their meaning. 55 Wealthy individuals had traditionally been an important source of long-term finance for small companies. Yet, private funding of new businesses by individual capitalists was said to have diminished after World War I, both due to changes in personal taxation and the growth of indirect investment vehicles such as insurance companies and investment trusts. 56 The impact of taxation may have resulted primarily from its form rather than its level (which was still very low by post-1945 standards)-death duties, or, rather, their avoidance, made it desirable for wealthy individuals to hold investments in liquid form rather than in loans to, or shares in, unquoted companies. 57 While large companies could turn to the stock market for longterm funds, a flotation was usually impracticable for firms requiring relatively small sums. The Macmillan Committee viewed £200,000 as the minimum economic size for a public issue. Analysis by J. B. Selwyn of new industrial issues during 1937 (when a number of institutions had already been launched with a view to reducing the cost of small issues) indicated that the cost of raising new preference and ordinary share capital of less than £150,000 was 11.6 percent of the overall value for public issues and 17.1 percent for public offers-where an issuing house bought the entire block of shares and then resold them via a prospectus issue. The average cost for all new capital (issues and offers) involving £150,000 or less, was given as 15.0 percent, compared to 6.9 percent for those over £150,000. Meanwhile, very small issues (below £50,000) were found to have an even higher expenses ratio, possibly in the order of 20 percent (though the small numbers involved made assessment more difficult).
58 It was generally held that, while transaction costs might Other financial institutions also tried to temper reductions, instead competing by liberalizing loan terms or moving into higher-yielding investments. Yet, the banks rejected liberalization (a policy adopted, with considerable success, by the building society movement) or widening the scope of their investments (the approach taken, for example, by the insurance companies, which expanded into areas such as ordinary shares, industrial mortgages, and leaseback finance). In both these cases the change in policy had been stimulated by intense competition within their sectors. 61 Conversely, the banks aimed for safety and high margins, relying on their tight cartel and near-monopoly position (at least with regard to most small/medium firms) to maintain loan volumes. Despite their low advances ratios and political pressure for lower interest rates and/or liberalized lending criteria, the 1930s did not witness any significant modification of lending policy. 62 The banks succeeded in combining an increased premium on overdrafts (relative to the Bank of England base rate) with an extremely low level of bad debts-at the expense of a fall in market share. 63 The sharpest declines involved larger firms, which turned to the stock exchange to replace bank loans by lower interest debenture issues. Firms of all sizes also made increased use of extra-bank lending. Insurance companies began to offer both long-term mortgage and leaseback finance to industry and shorter term loans on security, while building societies provided considerable finance for the booming residential building sector, and engaged in some mortgage lending on commercial premises. 64 Such encroachments were very limited in scope; for example, insurance companies generally excluded industrial premises from mortgages and leaseback deals, while building societies mainly confined their activities to the building sector. Yet, they were nevertheless irksome to the banks, as they tied up the type of collateral that might be used as security for bank advances. Hire purchase (HP) finance houses also expanded instalment finance on industrial equipment and plant, yet, still accounted for only around £2.5 million of producer credit by 1938. 65 The growth of such competition (mainly limited in scope to loans directly secured by marketable assets), together with extra-bank competition for deposits, contributed to a substantial relative decline in the weighting of the banking sector in Britain's domestic financial framework, as shown in Banks became very concerned about their declining market share and historically low advances ratios. Crick conducted regular analyses of the Midland's advances to explore the reasons behind their sluggish growth and the particularly dramatic decline in industrial advances, which had fallen from 64.8 percent of advances in February 1934 . . . owing to great pressure from Downing Street, he had decided that we could no longer put off the formation of this company . . . it was a matter of policy that all the banks should assist owing to the public criticism that has been levied against them in not assisting various industries. 76
The proposed company was to have a capital of £500,000, of which the Bank of England would contribute £100,000, the Big Five £50,000 each, and the smaller banks £10,000 each (the balance to be raised from two or three additional sources). Individual mortgages were not to exceed £50,000, or last for more than ten years. Four of the Big Five proved willing to go along with the Governor's proposals, the exception being Reginald McKenna of the Midland, who refused to subscribe more than £20,000. He asked the CLCB (apparently with the support of Lloyds) to consider a proposition by Charterhouse Investment Trust to set up a similar company (provisionally titled the Middle-Term Industrial Finance Corporation), ''. . . which would relieve the Bank of England from any participation . . . and would not involve a contribution from the big banks of more than £10,000 each. This would also avoid the necessity of the banks's involvement being publicly acknowledged, or the amount of their subscription being made known. '' 77 However, on March 6, 1934, Norman informed the CLCB that the Bank of England had decided not to participate in the Charterhouse proposal. He hinted that he was suspicious regarding whether the company would make a genuine contribution to bridging the Kinross and A. Butt-Philip, ''ICFC 1946 -1951 ,'' unpublished manuscript, c. 1976 HSBCGA, 30/29, memorandum to Midland board, 9 Feb. 1934, and 30/51, minutes of meeting of CLCB, 22 Feb. 1934. fill the present need and to satisfy demands for this class of facility, we will make no move. But if, in your opinion, this is not the case, we should feel bound to proceed with the alternative scheme . . . 78 Norman may also have been deterred by Charterhouse's dubious reputation. One of its founders, Sir Arthur Wheeler, had been convicted on 26 counts of fraudulent conversion in October 1931 (by which time he had left the Charterhouse Board) in a major scandal which almost led to Charterhouse being wound up and, at the height of which, one of its directors, Walter Burt, had committed suicide by throwing himself in front of a tube train. 79 The clearing bankers were also less than sanguine about the proposal; the representative of Martin's bank reported back that, of the large banks, only Lloyds appeared likely to agree to join Midland in subscribing to the Charterhouse venture. 80 In March 1934, Norman informed the CLCB that United Dominions Trust (UDT) had made a satisfactory offer to establish a small-firm finance company without the need for a direct financial contribution from the banks, via a new subsidiary-CFI. This proposal received the Committee's support, their requested participation being limited to providing the company with ordinary banking facilities. 81 CFI constituted the only substantial national attempt to breach the Macmillan Gap for typical small companies (rather than mediumlarge firms that might soon be suitable for a public share issue). Its performance is discussed below.
The Bank of England was also instrumental in establishing special financial facilities for new firms in four severely depressed 'Special Areas'-Clydeside, Durham and Tyneside, part of South Wales, and West Cumberland (excluding major cities in these areas, with the exception of Newcastle). In June 1936, following government pressure, it persuaded the banks, in conjunction with other financial institutions and industrial concerns, to launch the Special Areas Reconstruction Association (SARA) as a political gesture to help the Special Areas.
82 SARA was designed to provide loans to breach initial financial difficulties, for concerns that, ''. . . whilst having reasonable expectation of ultimate success on an economic basis . . . are not for the time being in a position to obtain financial facilities from banks or financial institutions primarily engaged in providing financial facilities for long or medium periods. '' 83 This initiative was later supplemented by the Nuffield Trust, financed by a gift of £2 million from Lord Nuffield, and the Treasury Fund, with a further £2 million-available to both the Special Areas and the more widely defined 'certified' depressed areas. These bodies enjoyed a strong measure of cooperation; they shared a number of key staff and jointly financed a substantial proportion of projects. According to a Bank of England memorandum, finance provided by the Special Areas finance organizations (SAO's) to the end of January 1939 amounted to £3,825,000, for some 207 enterprises, of which 109 were new to the Special Areas. About a third of these were located on government-financed trading estates. 84 Though they pursued more liberal lending policies than the other industrial finance organizations, their performance sheds little light on the scope of the national Macmillan Gap. They were limited to very small and severely depressed areas, none of which (with the partial exception of Clydeside) had any significant light manufacturing base or representation of expanding sectors. Conversely, many assisted firms involved refugee industrialists from Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia, who were effectively 'directed' to these areas under the refugees' admissions process. Some other clients were large firms, which opened branch factories. Moreover these bodies (particularly the Nuffield Trust and Treasury Fund) were motivated by employment creation rather than purely commercial considerations.
However, one interesting aspect of this initiative involved attempts at 'active investment'-providing financial and managerial advice as well as capital. SARA employed trained accountants and other technical experts to vet applications to the SAOs and make inspection visits to smaller clients. 85 One of these, Cecil D. Morrison, was later employed by the Nuffield Trust to visit firms and make 82. Carol E. Heim, ''Uneven Regional Development in Interwar Britain'' (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1982), 538; Carol E. Heim, ''Limits to Intervention: The Bank of England and Industrial Diversification in the Depressed Areas,'' Economic History Review 37, no. 4 (1984 ): 533-50. 83. Hansard, Vol. 318, 1936 -37, Col. 1392 , 2 Dec. 1936 , cited in Heim, ''Uneven Regional Development, '' 424. 84. BEA, EID4/159, ''The Special Areas, '' 26 July 1939. 85. Ibid., 458. recommendations concerning management or accountancy practices (sometimes even becoming a director). 86 Such after-care services bore some similarities to the 'active investment' modus operandi of the venture capital industry that emerged in the USA after 1945, involving participation in the management of assisted concerns, as directors rather than passive financiers. 87 After-care was developed more fully, with some success, in the government's postwar regionally assisted areas industrial finance machinery, at a cost equivalent to an additional interest rate of around 0.25 percent. 88
Reducing the Upper Limit of the Macmillan Gap
Despite failing to gain acceptance as the Bank of England's 'champion,' Charterhouse Investment Trust went ahead with its proposal to form a new subsidiary, now renamed the Charterhouse Industrial Development Co. (CID), in June 1934. However, as Norman had suspected, this organization proved much more limited in scope than either the Bank of England's proposed Industrial Mortgage Company, or CFI. Its stated purpose was, ''. . . to finance industrial business whose capital falls below the limit with which existing Issue Houses can deal by way of public issue or placing.'' 89 CID is one of the best known of the Macmillan Gap institutions and its very limited volume of business has been cited as evidence that there was no significant gap. 90 Yet, in fact, its scope and funds were severely limited. Furthermore, it was only one of a number of similar companies launched by issuing houses, merchant banks, and other organizations during the 1930s, some of which pursued more active lending policies. CID had an authorized capital of £500,000, all of which was issued by November 1935. Charterhouse held 53 percent (including all the original issued capital) while the Prudential subscribed 40 percent and the Lloyds and Midland banks took 5 and 2 percent respectively. 91 It sought only concerns that would be suitable for a public issue within a few years (which would be handled via the Charterhouse Investment Trust); indeed the primary aim of CID was to generate new issues business. 92 Eligible clients were further restricted to firms already operating commercially with a satisfactory profit record covering at least three years; that offered the prospect of becoming big businesses; and that had a management that was both capable of coping with this expanded scale and held a substantial financial interest in the business. 93 This type of assistance, involving 'nursing' companies in preparation for a public issue, was already being undertaken by a few companies, such as Investment Registry Ltd and the Industrial Finance and Investment Corporation (which was associated with the Prudential, and held £174,000 of unquoted investments by September 1935).
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Applicants were vetted both by its own staff and independent accountants, valuers, or solicitors (at the applicant's expense)-firms employed including Price Waterhouse; Merret, Son & Street; Spicer & Pegler; and Thomson McLintock. 95 CID required board representation, via a director who would exercise specific control over borrowing powers, capital expenditure, and increases in management remuneration. It demanded both fixed interest and equity participation-through either a direct ordinary share allocation, share options, or ''. . . by attaching participation rights to the fixed interest bearing capital. '' 96 In most cases, it acquired a controlling interest: its balance sheet for September 30, 1937 showed a cumulative investment of £403,575 in shares or debentures of companies where a controlling interest was held, together with £191,111 in other concerns. received funding by September 1935, several others had been at least partially approved, and most of its original funds had been deployed. 99 Yet, despite its short period of activity CID was successful in relation to its modest scale of operations. Gross profits increased from £10,032 in 1936 to £32,851 in 1939, by which time it had also accumulated reserves of £99,100. 100 Moreover, new issues business from CID generated major additional profits for Charterhouse, as discussed below. A very similar organization, Leadenhall Securities, was launched in July 1935 by the merchant bank, J. Henry Schroder & Co. Leadenhall aimed to invest in firms with prospects for stock market flotation within five years, in which it acquired a combination of ordinary and redeemable preference shares. Again, new issues business was a key motivation, income being generated through securities dealing, 'bond washing' (which was not then illegal), and participation in underwriting syndicates. 101 By 1938, Leadenhall had an issued capital of £125,002 and had loaned sums of £2,000 upwards, usually for 5 years or less, charging an interest rate of around 6 percent. The company also requested a free 10-15 percent equity allotment and a board representative, to act as a financial advisor.
102 A further company undertaking similar business was The New Trading Company, founded in October 1934 and largely funded by BrandeisGoldschmidt & Co. This financed a number of small British businesses and floated several companies established in Britain by foreign interests. 103 Another group of companies sought to assist firms that were too small for a conventional public issue, not by holding their securities until they had reached the critical size, but by reducing the minimum size threshold. One early innovator was the Cheviot Trust, founded by John Kinross in October 1933 to specialize in small issues of £25,000-100,000. It sought to reduce the costs of small public issues through removing most of the advertizing costs (which usually amounted to at least £8,000-10,000) by advertizing the prospectus in only one daily paper-the minimum Stock Exchange requirement-and using direct mailing to active lists of small investors as its main marketing vehicle. 104 Kinross claimed that over 1934-1938 he made over a hundred public issues of between £30,000-200,000 under various 'labels,' at costs that never exceeded 10 percent of the capital raised. Twenty-nine were launched under the Cheviot name, and about a dozen under the Covent Trust Ltd (Cheviot being reserved for what were considered the best issues). 105 All but two of these were said to be still operating in the mid-1970s (some having become part of larger groups). Ordinary shares were issued in small denominations, usually one shilling, so that Cheviot had sufficient volume for 'making the market' during the first few weeks of trading. Other issuing houses established to specialize in small company flotations included London Industrial Finance Trust, which made thirty-one issues between and 1939 , Ridgeford Industrial Investments, Lonsdale Investment Trust, and Whitehead Industrial Trust, founded in February 1936 , which became the most active issuing house for this type of business. 106 Most such organizations had a very limited capital (Cheviot had an initial capital of only £1,000 and a full-time staff of one). 107 Even the 'nursing' companies such as CID and Leadenhall were established by relatively small organizations. They thus restricted their activities to very safe propositions, as they could easily allocate all their limited capital to such projects, while even a single well-publicized failure might terminate their activities. Furthermore, both classes of institution sought their main profits not directly-from interest on, and equity in, assisted companies-but from share issue, dealing, and associated activities-the scope for which, in turn, strongly influenced their criteria for selecting propositions. For example, Kinross stated that Cheviot made most of its money from dealing in surplus equity acquired in addition to the prospectus issue, which was sold to the trust's shareholders at a small premium prior to the start of dealing and used to make the market during the first weeks of trading, typically experiencing rapid price growth. 108 As W. A. Thomas noted, most of the 'Macmillan Gap' institutions were, in reality ''. . . mere forcing houses for potential market material . . . they did not in the main tackle the problem of finding a home for unquoted issues.'' 109 While they played an important role in reducing the upper limit of the Macmillan Gap from £200,000 to £50-75,000 (the level given by E. H. D. Skinner of the Bank of England, in evidence to the Committee on Postwar Domestic Finance in 1943), their facilities were limited to companies almost ready for a public flotation, effectively excluding most industrial firms. 110 In 1935, over three-quarters of manufacturing establishments with eleven or more employees employed fewer than one hundred people, while even an average establishment with one hundred employees had an annual net output of only around £22,800, well below even the modified Macmillan Gap threshold. HP and other instalment finance. 114 It had also established a national presence, with twelve branch offices throughout Britain. 115 Bank of England interest in UDT began during the late 1920s, when Montagu Norman became concerned regarding a possible deficiency in the supply of medium-term credit to small-scale manufacturers and traders for machinery purchases. Expanding HP finance appeared to offer a solution and Norman selected UDT as his champion in this field-as it was the largest HP finance house, had a respected and entrepreneurial leader in J. Gibson Jarvie, and had considerable experience of dealing with manufacturers. 116 The Bank of England provided £250,000 to double UDT's paid-up ordinary share capital, the ensuing publicity leading to UDT being approached during the early 1930s by a number of industrial concerns that sought longer term credit and/or larger sums than were normally supplied under HP transactions.
117
Discussions between Jarvie and Norman regarding the establishment of a small-firm finance organization had been in progress since at least December 1933. 118 This was provisionally entitled ''The Industrial Credit Bank Ltd,'' though by the time of its launch (as a wholly owned UDT subsidiary) in March 1934 this had been changed to the more neutral, 'CFI'. 119 CFI's press release claimed that, ''. . . this new company will meet a specific criticism of our banking system made by the Macmillan Committee . . . '' 120 Despite Norman's and Jarvie's efforts to involve the clearing banks, the CLCB declined an invitation to appoint a nominee director. 121 Norman also tried to persuade a prominent clearing banker to serve as a director in an individual capacity. Bromley Martin of Martins Bank was approached and initially accepted-subject to the consent of his board-but failed to gain their agreement.
122
CFI aimed to assist established concerns whose capital requirements were too small to be served economically via the ordinary capital market. Funding was available only on adequate security and to companies which had traded successfully and could show a profit record of at least three years. 123 No equity interest was ever taken, finance being restricted to loans-usually secured on debentures or mortgages (though on occasions funds were loaned against ''personal undertakings supported by approved collateral''). 124 Crucially-unlike the banks-it was prepared to lend long-term, for capital purposes; sums of up to £50,000 being available, for up to twenty years. 125 CFI planned to establish regional advisory networks. By September 1934, it had set up a Scottish Advisory Board, which included several prominent Scottish businessmen. 126 By January 28, 1935 its Scottish loans totalled £65,000, while a further £5,000 worth had been approved. 127 Further boards for the North of England and South
Wales were envisaged, but the formation of SARA to finance firms in the Special Areas (which included substantial parts of these regions) appears to have led to these plans being shelved. In the two months or so after March 21, 1934, when CFI released its first press announcement, it received around 1,000 applications, the quality of which was stated to be better than expected. 128 Of these:
Three hundred come within scope of Corporation, have been partially investigated, and are likely to result in loans for, say, £400,000; Six hundred required further particulars; Fifty are outside the scope; Forty or so came within the province of the United Dominions Trust. 129 By June 30, 1943, CFI had loaned £896,264 to some 173 firms; loans ranging from a few hundred pounds to £60,000, with a mean value of £5,181. Applications had numbered around 8,000-9,000, while enquiries had been received from further 5,000-6,000 concerns. 130 Loans were widely spread by sector, though the largest group was the motor vehicle and engineering trades, which accounted for 41.0 percent of firms and 46.3 percent of loans. 131 This may reflect UDT's strong contacts in, and experience with, the motor, engineering, and allied trades-it was in these sectors that its HP business was initially concentrated. 132 All loans were to established businesses. The scale of CFI's lending was substantially less than might have been expected given the optimistic evaluation of its early proposals. Initial optimism rapidly evaporated when it became clear that it would not be allowed to finance a large proportion of proposals it vetted and approved. As Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales have noted, incumbent financiers have strong incentives to oppose measures of financial liberalization and development, as these threaten to undermine their competitive advantage-through reducing their privileged access to, and rents from, investment opportunities, and by changing the basis of credit evaluation and risk management so that incumbents' old skills become redundant and new ones become necessary. ''Financial development not only introduces competition, which destroys the financial institutions' rents and relationships . . . it also destroys the financier's human capital. '' 133 CFI's approach to industrial lending was much more threatening to the banks than the 'nursing institutions' reviewed above. Banks had traditionally assisted client firms seeking a public share issue (by, for example, allowing their names to be quoted in the prospectus), and innovations which enabled such firms to access the stock exchange a few years earlier in their development were not a significant challenge to them. Conversely, CFI sought to apply expert financial advice to the assessment of loan propositions for firms too small to turn to the stock market in the foreseeable future-challenging that segment of industrial business in which the banks' monopoly position was strongest. If successful, this approach both threatened to take business away from the banks and, more importantly, demonstrate the viability of screening mechanisms that might identify more worthy propositions, but at significantly greater cost than the banks' screening techniques. This might, in turn, lead to renewed public pressure for the banks themselves to employ expert advice, raising their transaction costs and eroding their monopoly profits.
The Banks had no difficulty in limiting CFI's expansion, as CFI relied on their support. They constituted significant shareholders of its parent company and also provided a large amount of UDT's working capital-via loans and acceptances. 134 Furthermore, given that assisted companies would still require normal banking facilities, the banks held an effective veto over CFI's clients-by threatening to withdraw facilities. Fears that the banks might sabotage the initiative are evident in a letter from Jarvie to Norman, which stated that CFI ''. . . will not ask or expect anything from the joint stock banks beyond ordinary and justifiable banking facilities and a sympathetic co-operation.'' 135 However, CFI did not receive such cooperation, as hinted at in a 1944 Bank of England memorandum on potential avenues for increasing the provision of finance to small businesses. This noted that, should the Bank of England choose to boost the financial resources of existing firms in this area, success would be blocked unless the banks would, ''. . . assure us that any existing company which has enjoyed facilities from the banks would continue to do so, notwithstanding the fact that the long-term concerns were technical competitors with the banks in their new venture. '' 136 Given their powerful position, Jarvie made it a rule not to advance money without the prior approval of the applicant's bank. However, this led to a substantial loss of business, as in many cases, after CFI had gone through the process of investigating a funding proposal which the firm's bank had previously declined, the bank in question then stepped in and provided the finance, if vetting was positive. 137 This post-vetting 'poaching' both greatly curtailed the scope of CFI's lending and inflated its administrative costs. By the end of June 1935, CFI had approved loans (at least in principle) totalling £1,272,421.
Of these, loans to the value of £649,900 had fallen through after being approved in principal, while a further £142,996 of firmly approved loans were still to be finally settled. Of the remaining firmly approved loans (£479,525), only £228,349 had been actually lent, as £251,176 of business had been lost through other parties providing the finance (mainly the firms' banks, which took business to the value of £207,000). 138 The financial statement from which these figures are derived does not give any details of potential business taken by the banks between the stages of provisional and final approval. However, in a meeting with Deputy Governor Catterns of the Bank of England on April 26, 1944, Jarvie stated that 75 percent of all potential investments ''. . . had been snapped up by banks who were supposed to be supporting him, and this after CFI had agreed to find the money.''
139
The surviving archives provide no definitive proof regarding whether the banks were merely 'cherry picking' the best CFI business, by free-riding on its screening activities, or were pursuing a more deliberate policy to block their new competitor. However, from CFI's perspective this made little difference, as the poaching prohibitively magnified its administrative costs; in June 1936 Jarvie had to report to his shareholders that these had become disproportionate to the company's revenue. 140 Thus CFI was prevented from taking any significant role in the small-firm finance market or offering the sort of competition to the banks that might have made them modify their own lending policies. Jarvie's experience was repeated after 1945, when the Bank of England pressured the Big Five into establishing the Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation (ICFC) as a new vehicle for bridging the Macmillan Gap. As the Corporation's official history notes, some of the banks persistently tried to poach ICFC loans it had screened positively, in an attempt to undermine the venture. 141 
Conclusion
Economic theory indicates that monopolists will reject a significant proportion of business that-though unprofitable from their monopoly perspective-would, nevertheless, have been successfully transacted in a competitive market. In the corporate lending market this involved firms which required long-term capital, or broader screening criteria to identify their credit-worthiness. 142 These were generally not the sort of high-risk, high-reward technologically based start-up companies that might attract wealthy financiers, but typically firms operating in established, competitive markets, that offered returns which were modest (but sufficient to secure finance if the banking system had also been competitive). The volume of such excluded business cannot be quantified even to a broad order of magnitude, for reasons outlined above. Yet, as banks' lending criteria generally excluded loans for capital purposes, and capital expenditure by small and medium firms was thus often limited to internal resources, it can be expected to be substantial.
While returns on such lending were not particularly high, they were sufficient to attract new entrants, as evidenced by the example of CFI. Yet, the banks' ability to withdraw overdraft facilities for working capital from firms that used such institutions for longer term investment acted as an effective sanction over market entry. By selectively poaching business from the pioneering entrant, the banks prevented the emergence of any significant specialist medium-longterm industrial lender of the type that emerged (with government support) in, for example, France and Germany. They thus, not only protected their market share, but blocked the development of new loan screening methods that were more costly but (if the willingness of the banks to take CFI's positively screened business is any indication) appeared to have been viewed as more effective than their own lowcost methods. In doing so, they preserved their super-normal profits, at the expense of those smaller firms located between the margins of the monopoly and competitive supply of credit.
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